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Abstract

Divorce law changes made in the 1970s affected marital formation, dissolution, and bargaining
within marriage. By altering the terms of the marital contract these legal changes impacted the
incentives for women to enter and remain in the labor force. Whereas earlier work had
suggested that the impact of unilateral divorce on female employment depended critically on
laws governing property division, I show that these results are not robust to alternative
specifications and controls. I find instead that unilateral divorce led to an increase in both
married and unmarried female labor force participation, regardless of the underlying property
laws.
JEL Codes: D1, J1, J2, K36, N3
Keywords: Marriage, divorce, household allocation, female labor force participation
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In the late 1960s and 1970s the laws governing both the grounds for divorce and rules for
dividing marital property upon divorce were significantly altered. Since then scholars have
examined the effects these new laws had on family dissolution, formation, and behavior within
marriage. Early work appealed to the Coase theorem, arguing that changing who has the right to
divorce—the person desiring a divorce or the spouse preferring to remain married—would have
no effect on the actual divorce rate. Empirical work using both cross-section and panel data
supported this hypothesis, finding little effect of the legal change from mutual consent to
unilateral divorce on the divorce rate.1
The finding of no effect of divorce laws on the divorce rate led Gray (1998) to argue that
unilateral divorce should only effect female labor supply to the extent that it changes bargaining
within households. Thus, reforms to divorce laws provided a unique opportunity to empirically
test competing models of the household bargaining. According to the pooled-income hypothesis,
divorce reform will only impact female labor supply through its effect on the probability of
divorce. In contrast, cooperative bargaining models predict that a shift in the distribution of
resources within marriage will influence household decision making.
Gray further argued that the shift in bargaining power when unilateral divorce laws were
adopted was determined by the underlying property division laws: bargaining power shifted
toward men when property laws favored them and shifted toward women when they were
favored by the property laws. As such he argued that “unilateral divorce has no significant
impact on married women’s labor-force participation unless the underlying marital-property laws
in each state are considered” (p. 629). These theoretical predictions and Gray’s finding that
female employment fell when unilateral divorce is combined with property division laws that
1

See Peters (1986), Parkman(1989), and Peters (1992).
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favor men and increases when combined with property division laws that favor women, yielded
clear support for cooperative bargaining models.
Unfortunately, the underlying assumption—that unilateral divorce had no impact on
divorce probabilities—has been subsequently shown to be false. Recent research has revealed
that the divorce rate did indeed rise following the adoption of unilateral divorce laws.2 While the
shift to unilateral divorce only explains a small rise in the probability of divorce, it also leads to a
decrease in marital duration as those who do divorce do so more rapidly under unilateral divorce
(Matouschek and Rasul, 2006). These two effects reduce the value of specialization within
marriage and therefore provide an incentive for married women to increase their labor supply
regardless of the underlying laws regarding property division.
Furthermore, while unilateral divorce’s affect on the divorce rate appears to dissipate
over time, this may partly reflect the impact of unilateral divorce laws on new marriages—
marriage rates fall, with those who do marry following unilateral divorce appearing to be better
selected than those who marry under mutual consent laws (Rasul, 2006). These empirical
findings imply that women in unilateral divorce states spend less of their adult life in marriage,
thus reaping fewer returns from specializing in the home, and having greater incentives to make
larger investments in market work. As such, this implication suggests that the labor force
participation of all women (who anticipate marriage at some point), not simply married women,
should rise, following the passage of unilateral divorce.
While unilateral divorce’s impact on time spent in marriage provides an incentive for
women to participate in market work regardless of the underlying laws regarding property
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Friedberg (1998) argued in the same issue of the AER that divorce rates did indeed rise once state-specific linear
trends were considered. Since then work by Wolfers (AER 2006) has confirmed a small rise in the divorce rate,
showing that there was a dynamic response with divorce rates spiking following the adoption of unilateral divorce
and slowly falling subsequently. He argues that the rise in divorce rates lasted about 10 years.
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division, its impact on household bargaining may lead to either an increase or a decrease in
female employment for those in existing marriages when divorce reform passes. Unilateral
divorce shifts bargaining power toward the spouse who values exiting the marriage most.
While Gray (1998) assumed that the laws regarding property division determined which spouse
values exiting the marriage most, this ignores a host of other factors that affect the value of
exiting the marriage, including the strategic behavior of spouses regarding investment in
marriage-specific capital. This paper reconsiders how bargaining power is shifted when
unilateral divorce is adopted, challenging the assumption that property division laws govern
which spouse gains bargaining power when unilateral divorce is adopted.
This paper revisits the question of the effect of divorce reform on female labor supply
examining both married and unmarried women’s labor force participation. My results suggest
that rather than providing support for cooperative bargaining models, the empirical results
presented in Gray (1998) reflect omitted variable bias. Correcting for these omitted variables
results in estimates of female employment effects that are similar for the adoption of unilateral
divorce across all types of property division laws and are close to those estimated in Peters
(1986). Furthermore, aggregate data over a longer time period indicate that both married and
unmarried women’s labor force participation did indeed rise more strongly in unilateral divorce
states than in comparison states.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: the next section considers how divorce reform
may impact married women’s labor supply decisions. Section II turns to results, first replicating
Gray’s results. I then examine an alternative test of Gray’s theory: whether unilateral divorce
affects female employment differentially for those with property to divide versus those without.
I next add state-level aggregate controls and demonstrate that the effect of unilateral divorce is
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invariant to the laws regarding property division once state-level controls have been added. This
section further considers the impact by marital duration showing that the impact of unilateral
divorce on female employment is greatest for those in the first 15 years of marriage. Finally, I
show, using state-level aggregate data, an increase over time in female employment in states that
adopt unilateral divorce compared with those that do not. Section IV concludes.

II: Divorce Reform and Married Women’s Labor Supply
Divorce reform may affect female labor supply either because it changes the value of
women’s bargaining position in the relationship or because it alters the returns to specialization
within marriage and thus the returns to market versus non-market work. Additionally,
Peters (1986) found a rise in female labor force participation in unilateral divorce states of
around 2 percentage points, arguing that unilateral divorce provided an incentive for women to
self-insure against divorce by investing in market skills.3
Gray (1998) interpreted his empirical estimates as suggesting that women in states where
the legal guidelines lead them to receive smaller settlements at divorce have less bargaining
power under unilateral divorce than they did under mutual consent divorce. In other words
women in these states prefer remaining married more than their husbands do and as such their
husbands gain when bargaining power is shifted to the person who values exiting the marriage
the most. Gray (1998) argued that because employment in the labor market is less of a joint
investment than work in the home, these women who lose bargaining power become less likely
to be employed in the labor market. Similarly, women in states that favor ex-wives in property
settlements value exiting the marriage more than do their husbands, and thus gain bargaining
power with unilateral divorce, and therefore work inside the home less, and thus outside the
3
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home more. In contrast, Chiappori, Fortin, and LaCroix (2002) estimate a structural model
where divorce laws enter by shifting the bargaining positions of the spouses. They find that
divorce laws that are favorable to women reduce married women’s labor supply
The assumption that women gain bargaining power when states with community or
equitable property division laws adopt unilateral divorce, and lose bargaining power when
common law property division states adopt unilateral divorce, relies on the assumption that on
average women in the former states value divorce more, and marriage less, than do men (with the
opposite being true in the latter). The Coase theorem is often invoked to understand how a shift
from unilateral divorce to mutual consent divorce shifts bargaining powering within the family.
Under mutual consent divorce laws the person desiring a divorce must compensate their spouse
such that he is at least as well off divorced as married. Such compensation occurs as long as the
joint return to divorce exceeds the joint return to remaining married. In contrast, unilateral
divorce requires that the person desiring to remain married must compensate their spouse until he
is at least as well off married as he would be divorced and again marriages continue when the
joint return is maximized by remaining married.
Divorce laws change the value of exiting the marriage. This changes bargaining within
households if the relevant threat point is the exit threat. Exit threat bargaining models emphasize
each spouse’s best option outside the marriage as the relevant parameters determining the intrahousehold distribution. Under mutual consent divorce, the relevant exit threat is to physically,
although not legally, leave the marriage. This exit provides no opportunity to remarry or any
legal claim to a share of the couple’s joint assets. In contrast, unilateral divorce laws provide for
a more attractive outside option, thus potentially changing the resulting bargain inside the
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marriage, with bargaining power being redistributed toward those for whom unilateral divorce
provides a credible threat to exit the marriage.
Laws regarding the division of property affect the legal parameters for the division of
assets, but since spouses know these laws at the time they marry and make subsequent
investment decisions, these laws do not uniquely determine which spouse has a higher value of
exiting the relationship. For example, if the woman prefers to divorce then the passage of
unilateral divorce laws transfers bargaining power to her regardless of the underlying property
laws. While she gets more resources when property laws favor women, bargaining power is
transferred to the woman even when property laws favor men, as the alternative without
unilateral divorce is to leave with no assets at all (or ability to remarry).
So how do we know whether women or men prefer to exit the marriage, and moreover
whether this varies by the laws regarding the division of property? First, it is important to note
that not all bargaining within marriage is determined by the threat to exit. For many couples who
are far from the divorce margin, the relevant threat points are internal to the marriage and thus
not impacted by divorce law.4 Thus, the empirical question is whether the transfer of bargaining
power subsequent to the adoption of unilateral divorce laws varies by gender and by property
division laws for those couples for whom the exit threat is relevant.
Empirical work has found that women are more likely to file for divorce: around twothirds of those filing for divorce are women. Brinig and Allen (2000) argue that one reason for
this is because women have a greater likelihood of getting custody of their children. Men who
value living with their children may therefore value exiting the marriage less than their wife.

4

For information on bargaining models that rely on threat points that are internal to the marriage see Lundberg &
Pollak (1993).
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Since property distribution laws don’t apply to custody, concerns over custody may impact the
value of exiting the marriage in a way that is uncorrelated with property division laws.
Women and men choose whether to marry, whom to marry, and subsequently make
decisions within marriage that reflect the underlying property laws. A woman who knows that
her spouse will get a greater division of the assets at divorce may choose to invest in fewer
shared assets, opting instead to invest in her options outside of marriage. Thus, at the time that
unilateral divorce laws pass, theory can provide us with little certainty as to whether men or
women are better off under unilateral divorce laws despite knowing the property division laws.
Theory provides much clearer guidance on how unilateral divorce may affect female
labor force participation through changing the value of household specialization. Becker’s
treatise on the family stressed that much of the value of marriage lay in the ability to specialize
within marriage; as such, the full benefits from marriage are realized when one spouse
specializes in the home, while the other specializes in the market (1981). These specialized
skills are highly complementary within a marriage, yet are less useful if single. Thus, if
unilateral divorce changes the proportion of one’s life spent outside of marriage, either by
increasing the probability of divorce, decreasing the expected duration of marriage, or decreasing
the probability of marriage, then it decreases the returns to such specialization. Indeed much
research has shown that divorce rates rise, marital duration falls, and marriage rates fall in the
wake of unilateral divorce.5 These empirical findings suggest that women’s labor force
participation, both while married and prior to marriage, should rise with the adoption of
unilateral divorce regardless of the underlying property division laws.

5

Wolfers (2006), Friedberg (1998) both find an increase, albeit small, in divorce resulting from unilateral divorce.
Rasul (2006) finds a decrease in the marriage rate and reduced duration of marriage is shown by Matouschek and
Rasul (2006).
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III: Empirical Results
Turning to the empirical results, I start by replicating and extending Gray’s results using
the 1970 and 1980 Censuses of Population. The primary regression he runs
is:
Employed i , s ,t = +

1

Unilateral w/ common laws ,t +

2

Unilateral w/ communitys ,t +

Equitable Divisions,t + Household nonlabor incomei , s ,t + Husband's Incomei , s ,t +

3

Unilateral w/ equitables ,t +

2

k (Kids

Ever Borni , s ,t ) k +

k =1

+ Any kids under 6i , s ,t + Agei , s ,t + µWhitei , s ,t + Educationi , s ,t + Urbani , s ,t + Year of Censust +

s

States +

s

where the ’s are the coefficients of interest. The effect of unilateral divorce is estimated
separately for the three property division regimes: common law, community property, and
equitable division.6 The same specification is also run replacing the three dummy variables with
a single indicator variable for unilateral divorce regardless of the type of property division. Gray
(1998) reports that one state in his sample changes from common law property division to
equitable division over this period; he therefore includes the direct effect of adopting equitable
property division in his regressions.7 Aside from state and year fixed effects, individual
characteristics are included as controls, although many of these controls may themselves be
changed by the adoption of unilateral divorce. For instance, existing research has shown an
effect of unilateral divorce on fertility. Husband’s income is particularly problematic as

6 Gray (1998) codes all states as following into one of these three property division regimes. There is, however,
some disagreement among legal scholars over this classification. For instance, this division ignores whether a state
had eliminated fault from consider in property division. Additionally, Jacob (1988) goes through property division
laws finding that by 1983 22 states had a provision to value the homemaking contribution of spouses, 19 states had
“unequivocally eliminated fault from consideration in property division” (p.121), and 5 states had switched to
“equal” distribution, 5 were ambiguous, while the remainder followed equitable division. For consistency, I follow
Gray’s coding of property division laws and his coding of unilateral divorce laws.
7
I follow his sample which excludes 5 states that changed their divorce laws in the late 1970s. Only one state in his
sample changed from common law property division to equitable division during this period. Thus equitable
division is included as a control, common law is the excluded category, and community property is collinear with
the state fixed effects and is therefore not included. Following Gray, the control for equitable division is not
included when the three dummy variables for unilateral divorce are replaced by a single indicator variable.
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i , s ,t

husbands and wives labor are jointly determined, presumably by household bargaining. Thus
any policy change that impacts household bargaining may impact both wives and husbands
earnings.
The first column of Table 1 reports Gray’s primary specification (his Table 3, columns 2
& 3).8 Panel A reports regressions where there are three dummy variables indicating whether a
state has unilateral divorce with equitable division, common law, or community property
division laws. Panel B reports regressions where the independent variable of interest is
measured as a single dummy variable indicating whether the state has unilateral divorce. The
second column replicates this specification using the same 1 in 1000 Censuses samples and
follows his coding of both the dependent and independent variables.9 The replication is nearly
exact with coefficient estimates within rounding error at the third decimal place.10
The next several columns investigate the hypothesis put forward by Gray that the
estimates of the response of married women’s labor supply to the adoption of unilateral divorce
is governed by how the state will divide property by considering the property that a couple owns.
The argument for why unilateral divorce affects women differently in common law states versus
equitable division or community property states is that men typically hold title to property in
common law states and thus have greater resources upon divorce. The most important asset that
most couples divide at divorce is their home (and this asset is also easily held only in the
husband’s name). As such, we would expect to see differences between home owners and
renters in the impact of unilateral divorce laws that vary by property regime, with the results

8

Gray (1998) reports t-statistics. I calculate the implied standard errors and show standard errors rather than tstatistics.
9
ICPSR studies: 0018 and 8101.
10
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis, calculated to be consistent with Gray (1998). Standard errors
clustered at the state level are reported below in brackets. Somewhat surprisingly, clustering yields smaller standard
errors.
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shown in columns 1 driven by those who own property. What we see instead is that the negative
relationship between married women’s employment and the adoption of unilateral divorce in
states with common law property division is driven largely by those who don’t own a home. The
change to unilateral divorce leads to a statistically significant 10 percentage point decrease
among renters in married women’s employment in states with common law property division. In
contrast, among home owners unilateral divorce leads to a non-significant 2 percentage point
fall. The coefficient on unilateral divorce with community property is similar across the two
groups and the coefficient on unilateral divorce with equitable division is positive for both
groups, albeit slightly larger for renters.
Similarly, we can disentangle the effects by race. Column 5 shows a large negative
effect—a statistically significant decrease in married women’s employment of 18 percentage
points when unilateral divorce is adopted in states with common law property division. In
comparison, non-black married women’s employment falls by 1.2 percentage points and is not
statistically significant. For blacks there is also a statistically significant fall in married women’s
employment when unilateral divorce is adopted by states with equitable division property
division laws. Looking at community property states, we see a large—10 percentage point—rise
in married black women’s employment when unilateral divorce is passed. Among non-blacks
there is a small increase in married women’s employment in both community property and
equitable division states that adopt unilateral divorce.
The results shown in columns 3-6 of Table 1 point to the potential for omitted variable
bias to be driving the effects found in Gray (1998).11 While many researchers have argued for

11

In tables available from the author on request I investigate two groups whose labor force participation should be
unaffected by household bargaining: Never married men and women ages 40 to 65. This older group of never
married individuals are unlikely to marry in the future (although it remains possible that being in this group is
affected by unilateral divorce laws). The coefficients for never-married men are similar to those shown for married
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the exogeneity of the adoption of unilateral divorce laws as they were adopted around the
country largely as a procedure refinement to already existing divorce law, there have not been
similar arguments made for the exogeneity of property division laws. Furthermore, in parsing
this effect out across the three property division regimes there are fewer state changes to identify
the effects. For instances, in community property states, all states except Louisiana had
unilateral divorce by 1973. Among common law states, 4 states changed their divorce laws to
allow unrestricted unilateral divorce—Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Rhode Island. The
majority of the states, 29, follow equitable division which had 4 states change their divorce law
to allow unilateral divorce prior to 1970, 17 that changed between 1970 and 1980, and 8 that had
not adopted unilateral divorce by 1980. The few states with community property or commonlaw property division laws may also have had other policy changes during the 1970s. Abortion
laws were changing, food stamp programs were being introduced and expanded, AFDC varied
and was changing, including AFDC for married couples through the AFDC-Unemployed Parent
program.
Table 2 seeks to reconsider Gray’s results, eliminating the endogenous individual control
variables, adding in control variables for state-level demographics and male unemployment, and
finally adding in controls for other policy changes that impacted families and potentially married
women’s employment. Additionally, I use the 1 in 100 census files provided by IPUMS which
both provide a larger sample and ensure uniform coding of variables across the years.
The first column shows that dropping the potentially endogenous variables attenuates the
estimated coefficients (the remaining individual level controls include a quadratic for age, a
women. Never-married men are more likely to work when states that have community property laws or equitable
division laws adopted unilateral divorce and less likely to work in states that adopted unilateral divorce with
common law property division. Never married women are more likely to work when unilateral divorce is adopted
regardless of the underlying laws governing property division. These findings point to the importance of
investigating omitted variable bias and sample selection effects further.
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saturated set of dummy variables for educational attainment, and race).12 Panel A shows a
negative relationship between married women’s employment and unilateral divorce in common
law states and a positive relationship for unilateral divorce in equitable and community property
division states and Panel B shows no statistically significant effect of unilateral divorce when the
effect is not allowed to vary by property laws. The next column adds controls for time-varying
factors at the state-level, such as the natural log of state personal income per capita, age
composition variables indicating the share of states’ populations aged 26-40, 41-55, 56-65, and
over 65, the share of the state’s population that is black, and the male unemployment rate. The
estimated effects in Panel A are now all positive, albeit not statistically significant. Panel B
shows an effect of unilateral divorce on married women’s labor supply of 0.4 percentage
points—similar to that estimated by Gray. While Gray concluded that there was no effect on
unilateral divorce on married women’s labor supply unless the underlying property division laws
were considered the estimate here, and that in Gray, is imprecisely measured and would allow
effects in either direction.
The third column adds controls for time-varying state-level policy such as the presence of
a food stamp program, the presence of welfare for families with an unemployed parent, the
maximum AFDC rate for a family of four, and whether a state allows abortion. Both Panels A &
B now show statistically significant increases in married women’s labor force participation of
about one-percentage point when unilateral divorce is adopted—regardless of the underlying
laws governing property division at divorce. Breaking this effect across the three property
regimes shows coefficient estimates that are similar across the three types of property laws. The
12

This includes correcting the coding of race. Gray coded Hispanics in only states sharing a border with Mexico as
non-white in 1970 and all Hispanics were coded as non-white in 1980. This derives from using two different
variables—Spanish surname and Hispanic—to define white. Since Hispanic is available for 1970 and 1980 a
consistent coding is available for these two periods. However, it is not possible to code Hispanic in 1960
consistently across all states.
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next column includes the states that were dropped from Gray’s analysis: Massachusetts,
Montana, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and Missouri (Gray dropped them because they changed
their divorce laws in the mid 1970s and therefore have less time to impact behavior). The
estimated coefficients remain similar when these states are included, albeit attenuated slightly.
The next few columns show that the large differences in effects on renters versus non-renters and
blacks versus non-blacks that were evident in Table1 are no longer evident once controls are
added for time-varying state-characteristics.
Tables 1 and 2 point to the problem of omitted variable bias in determining whether
unilateral divorce impacted married women’s labor force participation. Table 3 considers
whether selection into and out of marriage is affecting the estimates of the effect of unilateral
divorce on married women’s labor force participation by examining the impact by marital
duration. These columns show that unilateral divorce has the largest impact on the labor force
participation of women married 5-10 years, the period during which many marriages are most
likely to end. This relationship suggests that the threat of divorce is playing a role in the
relationship between unilateral divorce and whether married women work.
The results thus far have not been able to adequately address pre-existing trends. The
difficulty of establishing a relationship between unilateral divorce and marital outcomes given
the pre-existing differences among states in changes in norms and behavior regarding marriage
has led scholars to examine data sets that cover a long period and allow the dynamic response of
the policy change to be explicitly mapped out. The difficulty with married women’s labor force
participation is that the Current Population Statistics groups several states together during the
1970s reducing the number of state-years available for analysis.
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Figures 1a and 1b shows the aggregate labor force participation rates of married and all
women respectively using annual data from the March CPS. These figures show that female
labor force participation rose in the mid-1970s in states that adopted unilateral divorce relative to
those that did not (while states vary in the timing of adoption, states are simply grouped into
those that adopt unilateral divorce and those that do not). This rise for married women appears
to last about 10 years. In contrast, the labor force participation rates for all women rose and
remain about 2 percentage points higher in unilateral divorce states. This difference reflects the
greater labor force participation rates for unmarried women as well as married women. This
result is consistent with results that find lower marriage rates in unilateral divorce states; as a
result, unmarried women have a greater incentive to invest in market skills.
Table 4 examines these results exploiting the variation that comes from differences across
states in the timing of the adoption of unilateral divorce. Furthermore, the regression format
includes leads and lags for unilateral divorce to see if the timing evidence supports a role for
unilateral divorce in increasing female labor force participation. The CPS is potentially
problematic because several states are grouped together between 1968 and 1972 and others are
grouped together between1973 and 1976. Only around a quarter of the states are separately
identified over the entire period. I use all available state-years in the regressions shown in Table
4; however the results are similar when I include only states that can be individually identified
each year between 1968 and 1995.
The specification in the first column examines the relationship between unilateral divorce
and the employment of all women. By looking at all women, we look at the total effect on
employment—that stemming from changes in marital behavior as well as from changes within
marriage. The second column adds state-level aggregate controls. Both columns show a clear
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rise in female labor force participation that begins a few years after unilateral divorce is adopted.
Adding controls increases the estimated coefficients and sharpens the estimates. Both
specifications suggested that within 5 years of unilateral divorce female employment has risen by
2-3 percentage points.
Columns 3-4 in Table 4 show a less consistent pattern for married women. As was seen
in the earlier tables, the relationship between unilateral divorce and married women’s
employment is sensitive to the inclusion of state-level aggregate controls. The first column does
not include controls for other time varying state-level factors and we see a small and
insignificant effect of unilateral divorce on married women’s labor supply. Adding controls
leads to statistically significant increase of 2-3 percentage points that is not seen in the years
leading up to unilateral divorce and grows following the adoption of unilateral divorce.
IV: Conclusion
This paper examines how changing the laws governing divorce and property division
change women’s labor supply decisions. Divorce laws change the value of exiting the marriage
and thus potentially change bargaining within the household. These laws also potentially change
the returns to specialization in household production by reducing the amount of time women can
expect to spend in marriage and by increasing the returns to investing in one’s options outside of
marriage. In earlier work Gray (1998) argued that there was no direct affect of unilateral divorce
on female labor supply; rather the impact of unilateral divorce depends on the prevailing laws
governing property division. This paper revisits this question finding that the inability to find an
effect of unilateral divorce on female labor supply reflected omitted variable bias and
heterogeneity in treatment for women based on marital duration. Moreover, the small number of
states following common law property division and adopting unilateral divorce makes the
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finding of a negative effect on female employment in these states very sensitive to the sample
and specification used.
This paper adds a richer set of controls for state level time-varying factors and finds that
adding these controls yields estimates that imply an effect of unilateral divorce on female
employment that is similar across legal regimes for the division of property at divorce. These
findings suggest that unilateral divorce led to a 1 percentage point rise in female employment.
Considering martial duration leads to estimates that are double for those in the earlier years of
marriage, with little effect found for those married for 15 years or longer. Examining 25 years of
data shows an increase in female employment for both married and unmarried women following
unilateral divorce that reaches its peak 5 years after unilateral divorce is adopted and remains
about 2 percentage points higher than that in states that did not adopt unilateral divorce. These
findings point to divorce reform’s broader impact on the behavior of individuals both within and
outside of marriage.
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Table 1: Female Employment and the Adoption of Unilateral Divorce with Different Property Division Laws: Comparing Effects for
Different Groups
Gray
(AER
1998)
(1)

Replication

Renters

Home
Owners

Black

Non-black

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Panel A
Unilateral divorce w/
common law

-.036
(.015)

Unilateral divorce w/
equitable distribution

.013
(.010)

Unilateral divorce w/
community property

.023
(.012)

-.037
(.016)
{.004}
.013
(.011)
{.008}
.024
(.012)
{.005}

-.100
(.032)
{.012}
.023
(.021)
{.013}
.023
(.021)
{.011}

-.017
(.018)
{.005}
.009
(.012)
{.009}
.028
(.014)
{.008}

-.178
(.046)
{.022}
-.026
(.048)
{.018}
.113
(.043)
{.020}

-.012
(.017)
{.004}
.011
(.011)
{.008}
.022
(.012)
{.005}

.006
(.008)
{.007}

-.000
(.016)
{.013}

.008
(.010)
{.008}

-.053
(.031)
{.036}

.010
(.009)
{.006}

Panel B
Unilateral

.006
(.008)

Sample size
63,615
63,615
16,842
46,622
4,977
58,631
Notes: All columns report Probit estimates, evaluated at the cell mean.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the level of the state-year are in curly brackets.
Regression specification follows Gray (1998). Controls include state and year fixed effects, a dummy for non-hispanic white (Hispanics were not identified in
most states prior to 1980), a dummy for urban status, non-labor household income, husbands income, number of kids ever born , kids ever born squared, any kids
under 6, years of education, age.
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Table 2: Female Employment and the Adoption of Unilateral Divorce with Different Property Division Laws: Adding State-Level
Controls
Minimal
controls

+Aggregate
state-level
demographic
controls

+Aggregate
state-level
policy
controls

+Excluded
states

Renters

Home
Owners

Black

Non-Black

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-.010
(.005)
{.003}
.005
(.003)
{.006}
.004
(.004)
{.003}

.008
(.007)
{.008}
.005
(.004)
{.005}
.001
(.006)
{.006}

.010
(.007)
{.009}
.012
(.005)
{.007}
.010
(.008)
{.009}

.009
(.007)
{.008}
.013
(.005)
{.005}
.009
(.008)
{.009}

-.003
(.013)
{.015}
.005
(.010)
{.008}
.009
(.015)
{.015}

.011
(.008)
{.007}
.017
(.005)
{.006}
.006
(.010)
{.009}

.011
(.021)
{.077}
-.017
(.024)
{.016}
-.030
(.043)
{.025}

.011
(.007)
{.010}
.013
(.005)
{.005}
.011
(.008)
{.010}

.001
(.003)
{.003}

.004
(.003)
{.004}

.011
(.004)
{.006}

.012
(.004)
{.005}

.003
(.008)
{.008}

.014
(.004)
{.005}

-.006
(.017)
{.010}

.012
(.004)
{.005}

(1% Sample)

Panel A
Unilateral divorce w/
common law
Unilateral divorce w/
equitable distribution
Unilateral divorce w/
community property
Panel B
Unilateral

Reduced set of controls
State-level demographic
controls
State-level policy controls
Sample size
656,375
656,375
656,375
695,488
185,876
509,612
51,755
643,725
Notes: All columns report Probit estimates, evaluated at the cell mean.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the level of the state-year are in curly brackets.
The reduced set of controls includes dummy variables for white and black, a quadratic for age, a saturated set of dummy variables for education, along with state
and year fixed effects.
State-level demographic controls include age composition variables indicating the share of states’ populations aged 26-40, 41-55, 56-65, and over 65, the share of
the state’s population that is black, white and other the natural log of state personal income per capita, the unemployment rate.
State-level policy controls include the maximum AFDC rate for a family of four, existence of the AFDC unemployed parent and food stamp programs, and the
Donahue and Levitt coding of whether a state has abortion access
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Table 3: Female Employment and the Adoption of Unilateral Divorce with Different Property
Division Laws: Heterogeneity and Selection

Panel A
Unilateral divorce
w/ equitable
distribution
Unilateral divorce
w/ common law
Unilateral divorce
w/ community
property
Panel B
Unilateral

Married 5
years or
less
(1)

Married 510 years

.017
(.010)
{.007}
-.008
(.015)
{.012}
-.020
(.018)
{.012}

.014
(.013)
{.008}
.049
(.018)
{.014}
.019
(.022)
{.014}

.013
(.013)
{.010}
.034
(.019)
{.014}
.018
(.023)
{.013}

.016
(.007)
{.008}
-.007
(.010)
{.010}
.015
(.013)
{.011}

.006
(.008)
{.007}

.025
(.010)
{.007}

.020
(.011)
{.008}

.004
(.006)
{.007}

(2)

Married
11-15
years
(3)

Married
more than
15 years
(4)

State-level aggregate
controls and reduced
individual level
Sample size
125,050
100,499
89,211
283,765
Notes: All columns report Probit estimates, evaluated at the cell mean.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the level of the state-year are in curly
brackets.
The reduced set of controls includes dummy variables for white and black, a quadratic for age, a saturated set of
dummy variables for education, along with state and year fixed effects.
State-level aggregate controls include the maximum AFDC rate for a family of four, existence of the AFDC
unemployed parent and food stamp programs, the natural log of state personal income per capita, the unemployment
rate, age composition variables indicating the share of states’ populations aged 26-40, 41-55, 56-65, and over 65, the
Donahue and Levitt coding of whether a state has abortion access, and the share of the state’s population that is
black, white and other.
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TABLE 4
Effects of Unilateral Divorce on Female Employment
All Women
Column No

(1)

(2)

Married Women
(3)
(4)

1-3 years prior to change

-.004
(.008)

-.005
(.008)

-.003
(.010)

.000
(.009)

Year of change

-.002
(.010)

.008
(.010)

-.002
(.013)

.017
(.010)

1-3 years later

.010
(.008)

.012
(.008)

.001
(.010)

.017
(.008)

4-6 years later

.016
(.007)

.023
(.008)

.010
(.008)

.027
(.008)

7-9 years later

.015
(.007)

.023
(.008)

.006
(.010)

.026
(.008)

10 years or more later

.016
(.008)

.026
(.008)

.004
(.010)

.027
(.009)

Control variables
State and year fixed effects
Economic, demographic and
social policy controls#
Sample
Sample size

All states
1968-1995
(some state-years missing)
1116

All states
1968-1995
(some state-years missing)
1116

Dependent variable is the aggregate female employment rate in the state. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
#
Controls include the maximum AFDC rate for a family of four, existence of the AFDC unemployed parent and
food stamp programs, the natural log of state personal income per capita, the unemployment rate, age composition
variables indicating the share of states’ populations aged 14-19, and then ten-year cohorts beginning with age 20 up
to a variable for 90+, the Donahue and Levitt Effective access, and the share of the state’s population that is black,
white and other. (Employment status, age and race data are constructed from Unicon’s March CPS files, and refer to
the population aged 14 years or greater.)

24

